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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Joseph Paul Mobley appeals from the judgment of conviction entered
upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In May 2010, a Nampa police officer responded to Mercy Medical Center
where Laurel Deboi was being treated. (PSI, p.2; Trial Tr., p.215, L.24 - p.216,
L.15.)

Deboi informed the officer that earlier that night, her boyfriend, Joseph

Mobley, pushed her down, kicked her in the neck and stomach, punched her in
the face, and put his hands around her neck until she had trouble breathing.
(PSI, p.2; Trial Tr., p.133, L.11 - p.145, L.5.) The officer observed that Deboi's
left eye was swollen and black, and that she had bruising on her left arm and
neck. (PSI, p.2; Trial Tr., p.218, Ls.3-10.) At the hospital, Deboi was treated for
"[c]onsiderable left-sided facial and periorbital soft tissue swelling and/or
hemorrhage." (PSI, p.2.) After further investigation, the state charged Mobley
with felony domestic battery,

attempted strangulation,

and a sentencing

enhancement for committing these crimes in the presence of a child. (PSI, pp.23; R., pp.20-23.)
Mobley's first trial ended in a mistrial after the jury was unable to come to
a unanimous verdict on any of the charges.

(R., pp.50-53.)

During its

deliberations at the second trial, the jury sent the following message to the district
court: "We're split on one of the charges. How do we proceed with the charge
we're split on?" (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-10.) The district court replied, "[r]eread
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Instruction 28, Paragraph 6, 1 and continue to deliberate." (Trial Tr., p.11, Ls.1112.) The district court asked counsel for both parties if either had any objection
to this course of action, and both parties declined to object.

(Trial Tr., p.332,

Ls.13-17.)
The jury found Mobley guilty of felony domestic battery in the presence of
a child but acquitted him of attempted strangulation. (R., pp.84-85.) The district
court imposed a unified four and one-half year sentence with one and one-half
years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Mobley on probation for
three years. (R., pp.105-108.) Mobley timely appealed. (R., pp.109-110.)
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On appeal, Mobley contends that the portion of the jury instructions referenced
by the district court stated: "Consult with one another. Consider each other's
views, and deliberate with the objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do
so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each of you must decide this
case for yourself; but you should do so only after a discussion and consideration
of the case with your fellow jurors." (Appellant's brief, p.14.) While the district
court did so instruct the jury prior to its deliberations (Trial Tr., p.312, Ls.8-14),
the appellate record does not appear to contain the numbered jury instructions
actually presented to the jury. Therefore, it is not clear from the record which
instruction the court was referring to when it asked the jury to review "Instruction
28, Paragraph 6." Missing portions of the record are presumed to support the
decisions of the trial court. State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333,
334 (1996).
2

ISSUE
Mobley states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court violate Mr. Mobley's right to due
process when the court provided the jury with a "dynamite"
instruction upon being informed that the jury was deadlocked as to
one of the counts in this case?
(Appellant's brief, p.15.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Mobley failed to show fundamental error in the district court's
instruction to the jury to review a portion of the previously-given instructions and
to continue deliberations?
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ARGUMENT
Mobley Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The District Court's Instruction
To The Jury To Review A Portion Of The Previously-Given Instructions And To
Continue Deliberations

A.

Introduction
Mobley contends that the district court violated his rights by providing the

jury with a "dynamite instruction" upon being informed that the jurors were "split"
on one of the charges.

(Appellant's brief, pp.16-23.) Mobley's argument fails

because he has failed to show that the district court's instructions to review a
previously-given instruction and to continue deliberation constituted fundamental
error that would require reversal of his conviction.

B.

Mobley Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
A claim of error unpreserved for appellate review by a timely objection

may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes fundamental error." State v.
Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 2010).

In the

absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to remedy that error is
strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the defendant being
deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a
fair tribunal." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).
Relief without objection will be granted unless (1) the defendant
demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived constitutional rights
were violated;" (2) the constitutional error is "clear or obvious" on the record,
"without the need for any additional information" including information "as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant must
4

demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights," generally
by showing a reasonable probability that the error "affected the outcome of the
trial court proceedings."

kl at 226, 245 P.3d at 978.

Because Mobley expressly failed to object to the district court's instruction
to review a previously-given instruction and to continue deliberation, the Perry
fundamental error standard applies to his claim of error.

Application of that

standard demonstrates that Mobley has failed to satisfy any of its three prongs,
and has thus failed to show fundamental error that would entitle him to a reversal
of his conviction.

1.

The Perry Fundamental Error Standard Applies To Mobley's Claim

On appeal, Mobley first contends that the Perry fundamental error test
should not apply in this case because he did not have the opportunity to object
before the district court responded to the jury's question during their deliberation.
(Appellant's brief, pp.16-17.)

Mobley's contention fails because his assumption

that the district court instructed the jury before notifying counsel is not clearly
supported by the record. On the contrary, the minutes in the record indicate the
court sought the input of counsel prior to providing a response to the jury. (R.,
p.81.)

In any event, alleged errors that occur before a party has the opportunity

to object are still analyzed under the Perry fundamental error test.
The trial transcript reveals the following relevant exchange occurring
between the district court and counsel for both parties while the jury was
deliberating:
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THE COURT: All right. We're again taking up 2010-15105, and
the counsel are present. And the jury has sent out a question that
says, "We're split on one of the charges. How do we proceed with
the charge we're split on?"
The court has replied, "Reread Instruction 28, Paragraph 6, and
continue to deliberate."
If you have any objections to that, make your record.
[PROSECUTOR]: No objection from the State, Judge
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: No objection, Your Honor.
(Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-18.)
The court minutes of the same exchange read:
In answer to the Court's inquiry, each of counsel indicated
they had no objection to the Court's response to the question of the
jury.
The Court provided the written response to the Bailiff for
delivery to the jury.
The Court recessed at 1:03 p.m. to await the verdict of the
jury.
(R., p.81.)
The record thus reveals the likelihood that while the district court informed
the parties that it had "replied" to the jury, it did not yet actually deliver its written
response to the jury until after conferring with the parties and giving them the
opportunity to object.

Certainly, Mobley did not request clarification, or object to

the timing of the district court's instruction to the jury.

At worst, the appellate

record in this case is ambiguous as to when the district court actually instructed
the jury to review a previously-given instruction and to deliberate further.
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An

appellate court will not presume error. State v. Sima, 98 Idaho 643, 644, 570
P.2d 1333, 1334 (1977).
In any event, Mobley has cited no authority for the proposition that a
defendant is excused from his duty to object, and that the Perry fundamental
error test does not apply, where the alleged error occurs before the aggrieved
party has had the opportunity to object. He has therefore waived this issue on
appeal. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 923 P.2d 966 (1996) ("A party waives an
issue cited on appeal if either authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are
lacking.").
Further, Mobley's contention is incorrect.

It is a contemporaneous

objection, not necessarily an objection prior to the alleged error, which preserves
an issue for appeal.

See Perry 150 Idaho at 224-226, 245 P.3d at 976-978.

Where, for example, a defendant asserts that a prosecutor committed
misconduct during closing argument, or that a state witness improperly discussed
a defendant's post-Miranda silence, a defendant must still object following the
error at issue to preserve the objection. See State v. Thumm, 153 Idaho 533,
_ , 285 P.3d 348, 357-359 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Whitaker, 152 Idaho 945,
950-952, 277 P.3d 392, 397-399 (Ct. App. 2012); State v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,
181-189, 254 P.3d 77, 82-90 (Ct. App. 2011). Where there is no objection, such
alleged errors are analyzed under the Perry fundamental error test, even where
there was no opportunity to object prior to the alleged error. In those instances,
as in the present case, a party can still object after the alleged error occurs, and
request that the district court take appropriate corrective measures such as
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instructing the jury to disregard the error.

Mobley has failed to show that the

Perry fundamental error test does not apply to this case.

2.

Mobley Has Failed To Demonstrate That One Or More Of His
Unwaived Constitutional Rights Were Violated

A dynamite instruction "exhorts those jurors holding a minority view to
reconsider their position." State v. Pullin, 152 Idaho 82, 84 n.1, 266 P.3d 1187,
1189 n.1 (Ct. App. 2011). In order to avoid jury coercion, Idaho has adopted a
"blanket prohibition against dynamite instructions." State v. Flint, 114 Idaho 806,
812, 761 P.2d 1158, 1164 (1988). However, the United States Supreme Court
has rejected a claim that dynamite instructions are necessarily unconstitutional.
Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 239-241 (1988).

Instead, regulations of

such instructions are based on the United States Supreme Court's supervisory
powers over federal courts.

!9.:_

In order for a defendant to be denied a

constitutional right through the use of a dynamite instruction, the instruction must
be coercive. !9.:_; see also Pullin, 152 Idaho at 84-86, 266 P.3d at 1189-1191
(holding that Pullin failed to satisfy the first prong of the Perry fundamental error
test because he failed to show actual coercion such that the instruction given by
the court was unconstitutional.) Therefore, in order to satisfy the first prong of
the Perry fundamental error test, Mobley must show not merely that the district
court utilized a dynamite instruction, but that such instruction was actually
coercive.

Mobley has failed to show that the district court utilized a dynamite

instruction, much less than any such instruction was actually coercive.
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The court's response to the jury was not a "dynamite" instruction because
it did not "[exhort] those jurors holding a minority view to reconsider their
position." See Pullin, 152 Idaho at 84 n.1, 266 P.3d at 1189 n.1. The district
court did not single out any jurors in the minority of the split, or indicate to the jury
that it was required to find a verdict.
The court's response was also not coercive.

In State v. Timmons, 141

Idaho 376, 377-378, 109 P.3d 1118, 1119-1120 (Ct. App. 2005), in determining
that a district court's deliberation instruction was not coercive, the Idaho Court of
Appeals stated that its conclusion drew support from State v. Byerly, 109 Idaho
242, 706, P.2d 1353 (Ct. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Flint, 114
Idaho 806, 761 P.2d 1158.

In Byerly, in concluding that the district court's

comments to a jury during its deliberation were not coercive, the Idaho Court of
Appeals stated:
Here, the judge's comments did not (1) cast any light on the
merits of the case, (2) did not establish a deadline for reaching an
ultimate verdict, (3) made no allusions to the undesirability of a
retrial, (4) made no reference to the time or expense taken to try
the case, (5) did not insist the jury reveal the numerical division,
and (6) did not coerce a minority number of the jurors into
surrendering their conscious conviction or honest beliefs.
Byerly, 109 Idaho at 245, 706 P.2d at 1356.
In the present case, the district court's instructions to review a previouslygiven instruction and to continue deliberation did not contain any of the elements
of coercion described in Byerly. Further, the jury in the present case did not even
declare themselves deadlocked - they merely indicated they were "split on one
of the charges." (Trial Tr., p.332, Ls.6-10.) Finally, the lack of any objection by
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defense counsel, despite the district court specifically asking if counsel had any
objection, also indicates a lack of coercion. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 240 (lack of
an objection "indicates that the potential for coercion argued now was not
apparent to one on the spot"); see also Pullin, 152 Idaho at 86, 266 P.3d at 1191.
Mobley has failed to show that the district court's response to the jury during
deliberations constituted coercion, and he has therefore failed to show that one
or more of his unwaived constitutional rights were violated.

3.

Mobley Has Failed To Show That Any Alleged Error Was Clear Or
Obvious, Or That The Failure To Object Was Not A Tactical
Decision

For many of the reasons discussed above, Mobley cannot show that any
constitutional violation was "clear or obvious."

Likewise, in failing to object,

defense counsel may have made a tactical choice to let the jury continue to
deliberate in hopes that it would acquit Mobley on one or both charges. At the
point in the proceedings where the jury reported to the district court, it was
unknown how the jurors were "split" - they may have already decided to acquit
on the attempted strangulation charge, but were split on the felony domestic
battery charge. With this a possibility, Mobley's counsel may have been satisfied
with the way the trial had gone, and concluded that his client had a better chance
with the present jury than he would have on a re-trial. Mobley's description of the
facts in his Appellant's brief certainly illustrates, from the defense perspective,
multiple weaknesses in the state's case.

(See Appellant's brief, pp.1-14.)

If

Mobley's trial counsel shared a similar view of the state's case, there is every
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reason to believe he would have had strong tactical reasons to choose to
withhold any objection.
Mobley has failed to show that any alleged error was "clear or obvious," or
that his trial counsel's decision not to object to the district court's response to the
jury's question was merely a tactical decision.

Mobley has therefore failed to

meet the second prong of the Perry fundamental error analysis.

4.

Mobley Has Failed To Demonstrate That Any Alleged Error
Affected The Outcome Of The Trial Proceedings

Finally, Mobley has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the
district court's response to the jury's question during their deliberation affected
the outcome of the trial proceedings.

Mobley's assertion that his conviction to

felony domestic battery was the result of pressure from the district court to reach
a verdict is entirely speculative.

First, it is unknown when the jury unanimously

determined to convict Mobley of felony domestic battery - this determination may
have occurred before the jury even informed the district court that it was split on
"one of the charges."

Even if the district court did improperly pressure the jury, it

may have pressured them into acquitting Mobley of attempted strangulation.
Second, while it appears that the jury came back with its verdict only about an
hour after the judge replied to its inquiry, the jury had only been deliberating for
about one and one-half hours prior to reporting its "split" to the district court. (R.,
pp.80-81; Trial Tr., p.331, L.12 - p.332, L.10.)

Thus, there is nothing in the

timing of events at the trial proceeding that would support Mobley's assertion that
the court's response affected the outcome of the trial.
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Finally, for the reasons

discussed above, the district court's response to the jury's question was simply
not "coercive" - there is therefore no reasonable likelihood that its response
affected the outcome of the trial.
Mobley, who must satisfy all three prongs of the Perry fundamental error
analysis, has failed to meet any of them. He has therefore failed to show
fundamental error in the court's instruction.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Mobley's judgment of
conviction for felony domestic battery.
DATED this 29th day of January, 2013.

MARK W. OLSON
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 29th day of January 2013, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SARAH E. TOMPKINS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

MARK W. OLSON "'
Deputy Attorney General
MWO/pm
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